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Abstract
By vetoing one questions mutually efficient agreements. On the other
hand the threat of vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a
generalization of ultimatum bargaining (Suleiman, 1996) we first
elicit the responders‘ certainty equivalents for three different degrees
of veto power. Afterwards the corresponding bargaining rule is
implemented. The experimental data reveal that proposers are
afraid of more veto power but that responders only care for
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By vetoing one questions mutually efficient agreements. On the other hand the threat of
vetoing may prevent exploitation. Based on a generalization of ultimatum bargaining
(Suleiman, 1996) we first elicit the responders‘ certainty equivalents for three different
degrees of veto power. Afterwards the corresponding bargaining rule is implemented. The
experimental data reveal that proposers are afraid of more veto power but that responders
only care for commanding veto power at all, not for its strength.
1.  Introduction
Unlike when asking “Why do people vote?” (see Güth and Weck-Hannemann, 1997 for an
experimental study) the question “Why do people veto?” does not consider a large voting
body, but rather small groups. Veto power is crucial  in the ultimatum game (see Roth, 1995,
for a survey of experimental results). Here a positive monetary amount (the “pie”) is
distributed by first letting the proposer choose how much to offer and then the responder
accept or reject the offer. In case of acceptance the pie is shared as proposed. In case of
rejection both receive nothing.
Suleiman (1996) has generalized the ultimatum game by allowing for various parameters l  in
the range 0 £ l £ 1 measuring which share of the pie can be distributed even when the
responder rejects. More specifically, it is assumed that both, proposer and responder, receive
only a l-share of what has been proposed when the proposal is rejected. One extreme is l=0,
i.e. the ultimatum game, the other extreme  l=1 captures the dictator game where the
responder has no veto power at all (one can hardly call him a responder then, but we do
nevertheless.) By allowing also for  intermediate values of  l with  0  <  l  <  1 one can
distinguish various degrees of veto power, measured by 1-l.
In our experimental study we allow for l= 0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1. Whereas Suleiman (1996) only
explores how allocation behavior depends on  l, we are also interested in how much
responders care for the various degrees of veto power. The main regularities, observed by
Suleiman (1996)  are that2
-  mean offers do not monotonically increase with veto power (more specifically, 1-l=0
inspires more generous offers than 1-l=0,2 what could be viewed as a crowding out of
intrinsic proposer generosity, see Frey, 1997)
-  high veto power (1-l‡0,8 ) increases offers on average by 50% if compared to low or no
veto power (1-l£0,2)
-  rejection rates for l<1 increase greatly  (to 33%) when offers become unfair and 1-l is
positive.
Altogether the degree of veto power is strategically anticipated by proposers and provides an
effective insurance of responders against exploitation. In our experiment we explore the
anticipation of veto power more directly:
-  Will  responders invest in the acquisition of veto power?
-  Does their willingness to pay for veto power increase with the degree 1-l  of veto power?
-  Do acceptance thresholds of responders increase with their willingness to pay for veto
power?
-  Does the possibility to buy veto power suggest new fairness ideas, e.g. in the sense of new
reward standards as used in equity theory (see Homans, 1961)?
 
  One weakness of most experimental studies is that the payoff prospects are provided freely
and often randomly, i.e. participants do not feel entitled to fully exploit the advantages of their
position (see for a discussion  Hoffman and  Spitzer, 1985). This could be avoided by
auctioning roles instead of giving them away  freely (see Güth and Tietz, 1986). Here we do
not auction roles as such but only the responders‘ degree of veto power.  More specifically,
the responder either buys veto power (in the sense of l<1) or he commands no veto power at
all (l=1). To elicit responders‘ certainty equivalents for the three levels of positive veto power
(l= 0, 1/3, 2/3) we rely on the random price mechanism (Becker, de  Groot, and Marshak,
1964) which is incentive compatible (only truthful bids are weakly undominated strategies).
 
  First responders bid for all three positive degrees of veto power
1. Simultaneously proposers
choose their four offers for the four game types (if no veto power is bought, the dictator game
is played).  Responders then determine their acceptance thresholds for the three l-rules with
l<1. Finally we determine randomly the price for veto power and which of the three l values
can be bought.  Knowing the bids by responders and the random price we can determine for
each pair (of one proposer and one responder) the game type, i.e. the l -value. By matching
the respective offer with the corresponding acceptance threshold also the bargaining outcome
can be assessed. The monetary payoffs  p of the  proposer, respectively responder are
determined as
 
  pproposer = 3000-yl                , in case of acceptance 
2
  pproposer = (3000-yl ) ￿ l  ,in case of rejection
 
  presponder = yl   - p  + 1500                    , in case of acceptance
  presponder = yl  ￿  l  - p  + 1500       , in case of rejection
 
      where l=1 implies p=0 and where
                                                                
 
1 Thus we elicit the responder’s  willingness to pay for the possible degrees of veto power. A willingness to
accept-study would have provided responders with veto power and asked then at which prices they are willing to
give up veto power.
 
2 The unit is HUF (Hungarian Forint), 250 HUF=1$.3
 
  yl is the offer in case of l-veto power
   p is the price of veto power with l<1
  3000 is the size of the pie
  1500 is the monetary endowment of a responder 
3
 
  After information feedback has been provided about the bargaining outcome participants
repeat this overall game once with a new partner. Our statistical analysis can also rely on the
answers of a post-experimental questionnaire asking for reasons, emotional reactions, and
personal attitudes.
  The following section describes the experimental protocol in more detail. Sections 3, 4 and 5
describe and analyze the results before discussing them in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
 
 
2.  Experimental protocol
  The experiment was performed at the University of Debrecen  in February 2000. There were 5
sessions with 16 participants each and heterogeneity in the background of our volunteer
4
participants (students of biology, mathematics, law, economics, medicine, etc.). When
participants arrived we seated them randomly. By doing so we decided on their roles
(proposer, responder). They were placed as far as possible from each other in a large lecture
hall not being aware of the others’role.
  After they had read the instructions (see Appendix A for an English translation) they could
privately ask for clarification. Then they had to fill out a pre-experimental control
questionnaire  (see Appendix A) and got feedback on the answers immediately by the
experimenters. The rules were clarified privately till all participants had answered all
questions correctly. Reading the instructions and answering the control questionnaire took 60
minutes. Additional 30 minutes were needed to perform the two rounds, including the time for
providing feedback.
 
  Each round consists of the following stages:
 
-  Subjects in the role of responders decide about their bids l for the different degrees of veto
power (1-l  where l= 0, 1/3, 2/3) with 0 £ l £1500. If they cannot buy veto power –
because the price of veto power turns to be higher then their certainty equivalent l they
play the dictator game with l= 1. The responders do not know in advance which l-veto
power can be bought. This is decided by chance after all decisions sheets are collected.
While the responders determine the bids the proposers choose their four offers y with 0£ y
£ 3000  for any possible game-type with l=0, 1/3, 2/3, 1. They   know  neither the l-value
nor the price of veto power.
-  Responders choose –still not knowing the price of veto power-  their acceptance threshold
d with 0 £ d £ 3000 for l= 0, 1/3, 2/3 –veto power and specify their expected offer for
l=1 which they cannot reject (see Appendix A for decision form).
                                                                
 
3 To exclude negative outcomes.
 
4 We recruited them on leaflets saying “if you are interested in an experiment where you make decisions and  can
earn  money depending on your decisions- you are invited then to participate. Register for one of the 5
sessions...”.4
-  Experimenters determine the (for all responders same) random price from the set {1, 2,
......., 1500} and via the code-number the l-value with l< 1 which can be bought by an
individual responder.
-  Calculation of the results and providing  the necessary feedback information about the
outcome ( proposers:  l-rule and whether this  l-offer is accepted or not; responders:
random price, l-rule, l-offer).
After repeating this once with a new partner (from a matching group consisting of two
proposers and two responders) participants fill out the post-experimental questionnaire (see
Appendix A) before being privately paid.
3.  Descriptive data analysis
Choosing veto power means to aim at a certain institutional setup.  More veto power will be
usually more or less preferred if one expects better or worse payoffs. We therefore discuss
first of all the results of the various l-games  before turning attention to how responders
evaluate  the various degrees of veto power.
a.  Playing the games
  Contrary to the experimental process but in line with backward induction  (see  Selten, 1975)
we first look at response behavior, i.e. which offers y are seen as acceptable and how this
depends on the parameter l.
  Figures III.1.a, b, and c illustrate the distribution of acceptance thresholds d (in the sense that
only offers y‡ d  are accepted) for l=0, 1/3, respectively 2/3, for those participants who have
chosen a positive limit price  l for buying the respective 1-l veto power.
5
                                                                
 
5 The share of responder participants who did not bid positively (l>0) for veto power in the 1
st round, is 22 %,
10%, and  8% for l=0, 1/3, 2/3, respectively.  In the 2
nd round these ratios are : 22%,  8%, 5%.5












































































































  There are no significant experience effects regarding acceptance thresholds (Wilcoxon-tests),
so that is why the results from the two rounds are pooled .
  The mode is always the equal split, i.e. the most frequent attitude is to reject any unfair offer
(y< 1500). Standard deviations are very similar but quite unexpectedly the mean acceptance
threshold is with 1245 smallest for l= 0. The Number N of observations differs since the
number of positive limit prices l is not the same for the l-values (see Footnote 5.)
  The acceptance thresholds for l =0 on the one hand and l =1/3 and 2/3 on the other hand
differ significantly in both
6 rounds (Kendall-W-test, p=0,1)
7 while the thresholds for the two
higher value of l are the same both in the 1
st and in the 2
nd round. Altogether l does not have
a systematic effect on response behavior, and if at all, its effect is minor.
8 On how much
proposers offer, the degree of veto power, however, has a decisive influence. In table III/1 the
average absolute and relative offers, i.e. as shares of 3000 for the four different values of l are
listed. According to the non-parametric  Wilcoxon –tests, there is a significant difference in
the offers for any pair of two different l values
9 but again no significant experience effects
exist for any l-rule.
 
 
  Table III/1.: The average absolute and relative offers of 3000 for the four different values of l l
  l   mean offers (y) in 1
st round
 
  mean offers (y) in 2
nd round
    absolute
 
    relative  (3000)   absolute   relative (3000)
  0   1080   36%   1073   35%
  1/3   848   28%   841   28%
  2/3   765   25%   758   25%
  1   363   12%   341   11%
 
  The average relative offer in the ultimatum game (l=0), and the modal offer (equal split) (see
Figure III.2.a) are quite similar to the usual findings (see for example Bolle, 1990, Prasnikar
and Roth, 1992). This is by no means obvious since the responders‘ earnings can also include
the money, not spent on buying veto power. However, since the allocators are quite uncertain
about the price of veto power, they seem to ignore these additional earnings.
  The additional earnings may, however, account for the dictator offers.  Suleiman (1996) has
observed that allocators on average give 28% of the pie to responders whereas this share is
only 12 or 11% here. But if we compare the Suleiman data with the distribution of the shares
(y+1500)/4500 of the “enlarged pie” by taking into account the unspent monetary endowment
of responders, this share is increased to 40%. Thus in view of the “enlarged pie” our
proposers appear as more generous and in view of  what proposers can actually distribute (the
                                                                
 
6 According to rigorous statistical standards in the 2
nd round only the averages of matching groups are
independent. Since all experience effects are minor, this is neglected here. Our essential results rely on
significant 1
st round-effects and are confirmed by 2
nd round effects.
 
7 When comparing the thresholds we only consider the cases with  ll=0 >0 & ll=1/3 >0 & ll=2/3 >0. Figures III.1.a,
b and  c condition separately on positive limits. dl=0 < dl=1/3 (Wilcoxon-test, p=0,05) in both rounds. dl=0 < dl=2/3
(Wilcoxon-test, p=0,05) in the 1
st round.
 
8 In our analyses we usually use non-parametric tests for measuring relative but not absolute differences.
Obviously the absolute differences in the offers are much larger than in the acceptance thresholds (compare
Figures III.1.a, b, c to Figures III.2.a, b, c, d).
 
9 yl=0 >yl=1/3, p= 0,05, in the both rounds; yl=1/3 >yl=2/3, p=0,1 for the 2
nd round, non-significant for the 1
st round ;
yl=2/3 >yl=1, p= 0,01, in both rounds.7
“small pie” of 3000) as more thrifty.
10 For an easy graphical illustration Figures III.2.a to d
present the offer distributions for l=0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1, respectively.
 
 



































































                                                                
 
10 Another explanation would be that proposers do not care for the responder’s well being if the weakness of
responders is (most likely) self selected (see  Weiner, 1980 for related effects of self-responsibility).8
 


































































  Only for the extreme values of l there is an outstanding mode, namely the lowest range in
case of the dictator game (l=1), and the equal split-range in case of the ultimatum game
(l=0). For the intermediate l-values both modes coexist. What is different here is a stronger
tendency of compromising between strategic and fairness concerns by choosing offers y in the
range 350 £ y £ 1350 which accounts for 51% of the offers for l=1/3, and for 45 % in case of




a.  Choosing between games
Let us now describe how responders evaluate the different degrees of veto power (with no
veto power, i.e. l=1 serving as the status quo). Figures III.3.a, b and c give the distribution of
limit prices for l=0, 1/3, and 2/3.
12 The result is quite counterintuitive. On average responders
                                                                
 
11 The minor peak around y=750 can be, of course, also explained by equity theory applied to the “enlarged pie”
of 4500=3000+1500.
12 Although there is an experience effect for l=1/3 and l=2/3 (Wilcoxon tests, p=0,05), for an easy illustration




seem to evaluate more veto power less (the mean limit price is 381,4; 512,5; and 613,5 for
l=0, 1/3, and 2/3 respectively) and this difference is  significant for any comparison of limit
prices for different l-values in the both rounds (Wilcoxon test, p=0,05). Whereas for l=1/3
and 2/3 the mode is to invest up to one third of the monetary endowment (1500) in veto
power, limit prices for l=0 are more  evenly distributed in the range 0£ l £ 700 (the standard
deviation is largest for l=0). We thus can conclude:
More veto power is evaluated less. More specifically, the certainty equivalents l for higher
(l=0 versus l=1/3 or 2/3, l=1/3 versus l=2/3)  veto power are usually lower.
4.  Explaining behavior
Let us start our discussion with response behavior. The thresholds are lower for the ultimatum
game than for the other two values of l<1, but  there is no significant difference in thresholds
between  l=1/3 and 2/3. Neither game theory nor equity theory suggests that acceptance
thresholds should depend on l.  In table IV.1 we view any threshold d £ 200 as confirming
game theory and any threshold between 1400 and 1600 as inspired by equity theory where we
include all responder participants. 
13 We can conclude that  50% of the d-decisions  (120 out
of 240) fall either into  the category reflecting strategic thinking or equity considerations.
More (than twice as many) responders engage in equity considerations than in strategic
thinking.
Table IV.1.: The distribution of  d d decisions in the strategic (d d£ £200) or equity (1400£ £d d£ £1600) range
l=0  (N=80) l=1/3   (N=80) l=2/3    (N=80) All       (N=240)
d £ 200 2+19 2+7 2+5 6+31
1400 £ d £ 1600 25 26 32 83
Responders –who are in general very much inclined to punish
14- may, of course, consider
carefully how much it costs them to harm a greedy proposer. More specifically, responders
might rely on the relation  (1-l)x / (1-l)y for l<1 measuring the relative loss of the proposer
(as compared to the one of the responder) in case of rejection: Since the factor 1-l cancels
out, this provides another justification of no or weak  l-effects on response behavior. This can
account for the similarity of the  dl=1/3 and  dl=2/3 distribution.
15
                                                                
13 For all participants who chose 0 as limit price the threshold is 0. We account for them separately by adding
their number to the number of responders who bid positively and choose 0 as threshold.
14 The % share of positive acceptance thresholds is 74, 89, and 91 % for l=0, 1/3, 2/3.
15 A version of the ultimatum game where the relation of losses of both players is always 1 has been
experimentally investigated by Ahlert  et al. (1999).10
Figure III.3.a: The distribution of limit prices for l l=0 (mean=381, std.dev.=388,58, N=80)















Figure III.3.b.: The distribution of limit prices for l l=1/3 (mean=513, std.dev.=326,62, N=80)















Figure III.3.c.: The distribution of limit prices for l l=2/3 (mean=613, std.dev=326,24, N=80)















In sum we can conclude:
Acceptance thresholds usually are not higher for stronger veto power..
Regarding  the choice of certainty equivalents (l-values) our main result was that more veto
power is evaluated less. Since one does not command veto power at all when not buying it,
the payoff expectations for the dictator game (l=1) might explain why responders do not react
monotonically to veto power. Figures IV.1.a and b illustrate the expected offers for l= 1,

































































Compared to the actual offer distributions the expectations are far too optimistic. Even more
surprisingly they did not become significantly more realistic with experience (Wilcoxon test).
Although the payoff expectations for l= 1 might explain why responders do not want to
invest in veto power they cannot explain why the limit price l increases with  l.
Whereas the threat of veto power is an effective mean to induce fair offers (see Figures III.2.a,
b, c, d)) its actual execution implies always an inefficiency which increases with 1-l.  Could it
be that responders care for efficiency but anticipate that they might nevertheless engage in
punishing meager offers? More specifically, assume that a responder when choosing the limit
price  l is mainly guided by efficiency considerations but anticipates that she will reject
meager offers, e.g. offers in the range y £ 1000 for l<1. If this responder expects – quite
realistically- heterogeneity in offers, she will predict conflict with positive probability. Then
the efficiency minded responder, when choosing l, could argue: “I better do not care for more
veto power since this would imply an (even greater) inefficiency in case of conflict”.
Whereas such an argument can explain even a decreasing evaluation of (the strength of) veto
power, it does not account for the phenomenon of positive limit prices l (87% of all limit
prices l are positive). By setting l=0 an efficiency minded proposer always could exclude veto
power and thus the risk of rejection. Apparently most responder participants were afraid of12
being powerless (in spite of their too optimistic expectations for l= 1). It seems that veto
power is seen as an effective mean of self defense (preventing exploitation by meager offers)
but also as something to be afraid of (one can hurt oneself by executing veto power). 
16
Another explanation for avoiding strong veto power can be the (belief in) crowding out (see
Frey, 1997) of proposer generosity by veto power. The argument is here that proposers only
feel responsible  for the well-being of responders when responders are powerless. So
acquiring veto power means to substitute intrinsic proposer generosity by  proposer fear of
rejection, a substitution which a responder may regret. This can explain why veto power is
only poorly (small l values) or not at all (l=0) evaluated. The argument does not explain,
however, that the counterintuitive l-monotonic evaluation of veto power usually goes along
with high limit prices l. 
17
In view of our data (especially the expected offers in case of l=1) responders were much too
optimistic concerning proposer generosity when proposers do not have to fear a veto. Did this
result in higher limit prices in the 2
nd round (after experiencing  proposer greediness)? In
Figures IV.2 the left diagram illustrates the actual  l=1 offer distribution in the 1
st round. The
right diagram presents the change in the average limit prices of their responders(individual
averages of the three l-choices for l= 0, 1/3, 2/3) from round 1 to round 2. For only 1
responder the change is negative, for 14 there is no change whereas 18 reacted with a higher
(average) evaluation of veto power. Although altogether the correlation between experienced
l=1-offers in round 1 and the change in the average  limit price from the 1
st to the 2
nd round is
insignificantly negative(  Spearman correlation, -0,21), this negative dependence becomes
significant (Spearman correlation: -0,34) when excluding responders whose average limit
prices did not change at all.
                                                                
16 One is reminded of the discussion  (mainly in the United States of America) whether arms (guns etc.) in
private hands is a welcome possibility of self-defense or a risk (by allowing much more dramatic accidents and
crimes).
17 Crowding out is usually seen as being driven by extrinsic concerns (here veto power) and not by their
relevance (here the degree of veto power). l-monotonicity at high limit prices would mean that responders
believe in l-dependent crowding out but trust even more in proposers’ fear of rejection.13
Figure IV.2: Actual offer distribution in the 1
st


























Figure IV.2: Change in average limit prices
 from round 1 to round 2 for those responders
 who played the dictator game in the 1
st round
(mean=88, std.dev.=143,34, N=33)















We can conclude that responders trust less in intrinsic proposer generosity in the 2
nd round
18.
Moreover, the changes in limit prices from the 1
st to the 2
nd round are negatively  correlated
with experienced dictator offers. Nevertheless in the 2
nd  round  many responders remain l-
monotonic in limit prices (mean  l for l=0, l=1/3, l=2/3 are 310, 515, 612, respectively).
Thus  from the 1
st to the 2
nd round responders did not vary much in their regard of efficiency
and /or crowding out.
5.  Types of behavior
We again start with responders who can be classified in
-(weakly) 1-l-monotonic types satisfying l (l=0) ‡ l (l=1/3) ‡ l (l=2/3) who do not evaluate
more veto power less 
19  and
-l-monotonic  types with l (l=0) £ l (l=1/3) £ l (l=2/3) and l (l=0)< l (l=2/3) who at least
once react negatively to more veto power 
20.
In Table V.1. we count the two types separately for the 1
st and 2
nd round and for constancy
over both rounds. Of the altogether 40 responders 21 are constantly l-monotonic, i.e. meet the
criterion of l-monotonicity in both rounds. Thus 5 l-monotonic responders unlearn and 3
other responders learn l-monotonicity from the 1
st to the 2
nd round 
21.
                                                                
18 The limit price l in the 2
nd round is larger than  the one in the 1
st round for responders with l=1 in the 1
st round
(for l=1/3 and 2/3 it is significant at p=0,01, Wilcoxon test, for l=0 it is weakly significant, p=0,108).
19 Notice that game theory suggests l=0 and 0- acceptance thresholds, i.e. non-reactivity to l.
20 There were  only 2 persons in both rounds who did not correspond to one of the two types. We ignore them in
the following.
21 One might , of course, rely on a more demanding classification  of  types by demanding the corresponding
criterion also for the acceptance thresholds, e.g. d (l=0)  ‡  d (l=1/3) ‡  d (l=2/3) for (weakly)1-l-monotonic
demands.  In Table V.1 the numbers, implied by such a more restrictive definition are given in brackets.
Regarding thresholds d we let equality even for the group called by limit prices 1-l-monotonic:d (l=0)  £  d
(l=1/3) £ d (l=2/3). The number of consistently l-monotonic types, whose thresholds d also are l-monotonic is
(with 13 out of 40 or 32 %) still impressively large.14
Table V.1.: The classification of responders’ types
The first number refers to classification based on certainty equivalents, the numbers in brackets also take the
thresholds into account .
type 1
st round 2
nd round in both rounds
(weakly)1-l-monotonic 12  (12) 14  (11) 10  (8)
l monotonic 26  (21) 24  (17) 21 (13)
Table V.2 reveals a dramatic difference in the expected l=1-offer for 1-l-monotonic (mean
expected offer 625) and l-monotonic (mean expected offer 1225) types in the 1
st round
(p=0,01, Mann-Whitney test). For the 2
nd round the difference is greatly reduced and non-
significant.
22
Table V.2: Expected  dictator-offers for the two responder types
type of responder mean expectation (yl=1) in the
1
st round
mean expectation (yl=1) in the
2
nd round
(weakly)1-l- monotonic 625 893
l monotonic 1225 979
Proposers are mostly 1-l-monotonic in the sense y (l=1) £ y (l=2/3) £ y (l=1/3) £ y (l=0)
and y (l=1) < y ( l=0) of offering more when facing a more powerful responder (19 of
altogether 40 proposers in the 1
st round, 20 in the 2
nd round and 17 consistently for both
rounds). 4 proposers who are consistently l-monotonic in both rounds when l<1 offer less in
the dictator game than in the game with l=2/3.
The equity oriented proposers with 1400£ y £ 1600 regardless of l = 0, 1/3, 2/3 or 1 are rather
rare (3 in the 1
st round, 2 in the 2
nd round and 1 consistently over both rounds). There is
another equity oriented type of proposers who rely on the “enlarged pie” of 4500 by including
the 1500 endowment of proposers. Such  proposers offer y=750 what implies (in case of
acceptance) an equal split of the “enlarged pie” (10%, 12% in the 1
st, respectively in the 2
nd
round, 8 % constantly for both rounds). For a larger range, e.g. in the sense of 650£y£850 the
percentages do not much increase.
The dominance of l-monotonic limit prices in the strict form of l(l=0£l(l=1/3)£ l(l=2/3) &
l(l=0)< l(l=2/3) is very surprising and appears at first sight quite counterintuitive. Let us
therefore perceive the situation of a responder who, when determining the three limit prices
l(l=0), l(l=1/3), l(l=2/3) has to anticipate how offers y and-in a multiple selves –tradition 
23
(see Frank, 1996)-how acceptance thresholds d depend on  l. How can one specify such
anticipated reactions? One way is to assume true expectations, i.e. responders anticipate the
true offers y and the true acceptance thresholds d. The implications for true expectations are
described by Table V.3. It lists for each  l-value in the first column the expected joint payoff
(the sum of the average expected payoffs for the proposer and the responder) and the average
                                                                
22 There is  diversity in information feedback: Some responders learn what the dictator offers (l=1) but others do
not. Consequently for a more clear picture in the 2
nd round one should control for information feedback,
especially which  dictator offer has been experienced in the 1
st round.
23 What is meant here is that a responder predicts his own response behavior as he predicts proposer behavior,
e.g. like “I can well imagine that a meager offer will upset me a lot and that I will love to reject it if I can”.15
rejection rate, in the second  column the average expected responder payoff, separately for 1-
l-monotonic and for l-monotonic responders.
24
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What Table V.3. suggests is that  l-monotonic responders could be efficiency guided or
rejection-minded: In the range l< 1 both, the “expected sum” as well as the “rejection rate”
are largest for l=2/3 in round 1 and 2. Since the average (expected ) responder payoff is
always largest for l=0, this can be viewed  as supporting “1-l-monotonicity”. These payoffs
are, however, consistently u-shaped, i.e. higher for  l=0 and  l=2/3 than for  l=1/3. The
average limit prices  l neither of the (weakly) 1-l-monotonic nor of the  l-monotonic
responders reflect the u-shaped incentives derived from true expectations.
Now responders could hardly know how proposers and responders will play the various l-
games. Furthermore, a responder might not care what responders in general will reject but
rather rely on his own, possibly very untypical (anticipated) response behavior. Nevertheless
we think that Table V.3. provides a surprising insight in actual incentives of responders: Since
a switch from l=0 to l=2/3 increases the “expected sum” by 843 or 60% at the expence of a
134 or 18% reduction of the own payoff in the 1
st round, respectively by 599 or 35% at the
expense of  193 or 24% in round 2, efficiency minded responders could be induced to avoid
the “less efficient” ultimatum game. Whereas it could be intuitively expected how the sum of
payoffs increases with l and that responders will earn most by playing the ultimatum game,
the u-shape of the average expected responder payoff is a striking phenomenon which
apparently none of the responder participants has anticipated.
                                                                
24 The calculation for each l-value matches every l-offer with every l-acceptance threshold of our data file what
determines an average rejection rate and average payoffs.16
6.  Discussion
To answer the question “Why do people veto?” let us first consider why responders could care
for veto power. A convincing reason is that  proposers offer more the more veto power
responders command. Thus by accepting  all (positive) offers responders would earn more
and should thus be willing to decrease l with an increasing l-parameter. This can explain the
behavior of only one of   the altogether 4 responders with strictly  monotonic limit prices  l
(l=0)  >  l ( l=1/3)  >  l ( l=2/3) and low acceptance thresholds, e.g.  d£ 200. Since most
responders do not accept all positive offers in case of l< 1, their expectations for the various
l-rules should also take into account the possibility of rejecting such offers. As shown by
Table V.3. the incentive to acquire veto power is then less obvious. Thus the crucial question
seems to be “why do people veto?”.
The answer to “Why do responders care for veto power?” does not predetermine how to
answer “Why do responders veto?”. Influencing the l-rule via one’s bid l for a l-rule with
l<1 instead of playing the l=1 dictator game is an institutional device which affects both, the
proposer who can condition his offer on the prevailing  l-rule as well as the responder.
Compared to this vetoing by choosing a positive acceptance threshold  d is a behavioral
attitude within a given institutional setting ( in the sense of a given  l-rule). It is quite
reasonable to bid 1-l monotonically –l (l=0) > l (l=1/3) > l (l=2/3) – but not to veto at all
(e.g. in the sense of  d £ 200 for any l).
Nevertheless we have strong evidence that responders veto (91% of all responders choose at
least one acceptance thresholds d> 200; for the 1
st (2
nd) round this share is 90 % and 92 %,
respectively). Most theoretical studies, inspired by data of ultimatum experiments, have tried
to answer the question why responders reject substantial positive offers like y offers satisfying
y  > 200  (for instance see Bolton,1991, Rabin,1993,  Kirchsteiger, 1994,  Bolton and
Ockenfels, 1999,  Fehr and Schmidt,1999,   Binmore and  Samuelson, 1994,  Huck and
Oechsler, 1999, Roth and Erev,1995). Generally, the explanation is based on fairness issues:
Responders reject those offers which are seen as unacceptably unfair even if substantial.
Table VI.1. shows the importance of fairness according to the post-experimental
questionnaire
25 by those responders who chose d below (above)  the median d for l=0, 1/3,
and  2/3. The last column lists the means from those responders who were consistent in
choosing relatively low (high) d  values for the different degrees  of veto power.
Table VI.1.: Do responders reject offers driven by motive of fairness? The subjective importance of
fairness for groups of relatively low (high) acceptance thresholds  d d.
(Only cases l > 0 are presented.
26)
l=0 l=1/3 l=2/3 l=0 &
l=1/3 &
l=2/3
d£ median d 3,46 (N=15) 3,38 (N=18) 3,3 (N=18) 3,1 (N=10)
d> median d 3,60(N=15) 3,86 (N=18) 3,9 (N=19) 4 (N=10)
Results  from M-W-u tests Non sign. p= 0,1 p=0,05 p=0,1
                                                                
25 Two questions are related to the importance of fairness issues. The subjects replied from 1 to 5 expressing the
subjective importance of the following motives  playing the game: “I wanted a fair income distribution with my
partner” and “I wanted to prevent the chance of injustice”. The correlation of the answers to these two questions
(in the sample of responders)  is 0,48, so that the use of  a combined value is justified (the average).
26 Although  l=0 implies (factually) d=0, it does not mean necessarily that the responder would accept any offer
if she  played ultimatum game.17
The results are in line with the hypothesis that responders who reject larger offers care more
about fairness. Quite interestingly this relationship is the strongest when  l=2/3. Fairness
driven responders express their behavioral  attitude more consistently when environmental
constraints are  weaker in the sense that the losses resulting from rejections are low. This is
perfectly in line with the results of research focusing on the relationship between attitude and
behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977, Ajzen, 1991).
Moreover this result attracts attention to another explanation of why less veto power is
evaluated more. Weaker veto power allows responders to express quite freely their attitudes,
i.e. opinions about the fair distribution . Such possibility is appreciated  by those engaged in
the interaction. This effect is known as “voice” effect ( Thibaut and Walker, 1978,
Greenberg,1990) in social justice research.
Since veto power is not granted freely, we might explain positive acceptance thresholds by a
sunk cost argument
27 (which would also be applicable in the study of Güth and Tietz,   , who
have auctioned responder roles).  When testing this effect we control for fairness orientation.
More specifically the linear regression analysis of the average acceptance threshold accounts
for the average limit price and the relative importance of fairness. That is why we test the
sunk cost hypothesis choosing the method of linear regressions on the average acceptance
threshold where we enter the average limit price and the relative importance of fairness.
28
In Table VI.2. we present the regression results for both rounds. In view of the poor
explanation for the whole sample, we executed regression analyses separately for the two
major responder types (1-l-monotonic, l-monotonic). By doing so we reached considerable
improvement. Based on the results presented in Table VI.2 we can conclude that for 1-l-
monotonic-type  it is the sunk-cost argument which explains the variance in acceptance
thresholds. This is in sharp contrast with the group of l-monotonic responders who are more
influenced by fairness considerations.
Table VI.2.: What are the determinants of thresholds?
The results from linear regressions on  average d d
bF= the b value for subjective importance of fairness in the equation









2=0,07              p=0,34
bF=0,15              p=0,33
bl=0,22               p=0,33
R=0,20
R
2=0,04                  p=0,55
bF=0,09                  p=0,62
bl=0,19                   p=0,31
1-l l-monotonic-type





2=0,52              p=0,07
bF= -0,37            p=0,21
b bl=0,519             p=0,10
R=0,40
R
2=0,16                  p=0,40
bF= -0,33                p=0,27
bl=0,23,                  p=0,43
l l-monotonic -type





2=0,40              p=0,02
b bF= 0,60             p=0,01
bl= 0,14              p=0,47
R=0,58
R
2=0,33                   p=0,07
b bF= 0,55                  p=0,03
bl=0,30                    p=0,21
                                                                
27 Normatively sunk costs do not matter, of course, but behaviorally we are prone to yield to them
28 Taking the averages is justified because the sunk cost effect works  at the individual level and since nothing
speaks for a l-dependence.18
7. Conclusions
How do our results help to answer the questions, raised in the introduction?
Do responders invest in veto power? More than 90% invested at least in one l-type of veto
power with l<1 and this attitude is rather stable  (see Footnote 5). Those who invest (choose
positive limit prices l ) usually invest 1/3 of the monetary endowment of 1500. Thus overall
responders are reluctant to rely on trust that proposers are intrinsically fair ( even when l=1).
Do limit prices l increase with 1-l? This is true only for ¼ of the responders who were
classified as “1-l- monotonic”. The stronger group of  “l-monotonic” responders surprisingly
evaluates more veto power (smaller  l) less although many of them rely on substantial limit
prices. One can explain the latter type of behavior by a desire of responder to have a “voice”,
i.e. to be able to reject, but not necessarily in a harmful way.
Do acceptance thresholds d increase with the willingness to pay l for veto power? The answer
is yes for the 1-l-monotonic responders whereas the surprisingly much stronger group of l-
monotonic responders is more influenced by fairness concerns.
Does costly acquired veto power suggest new fairness ideas? At least for the dictator game
(l=1) there is an obvious alternative to fair offers y=1500, namely to split the “enlarged pie”
4500=3000+1500 equally, i.e. the offer of y=750. According to Figure III.2.d proposers, if
they are fair, prefer usually the lower fair offer of 750. Most proposers, however, do not mind
to rely on y=0 what means that the responder only keeps his monetary endowment. For l-
values with l<1 one would expect that the commonly known price of  l-veto power suggests
new contributions and/or rewards in the terminology of equity theory (Homans, 1961). Since
the information has not been provided in our experiment, we cannot asses the importance of
such alternative ideas. Future research which is mainly interested in testing such competing
fairness ideas should inform both players about the actual price of veto power (if bought)
before playing the game.
The tremendous support of endowment or status quo-effects (see, for instance Kahneman,
Knetch, and Thaler, 1990) suggests that in a  willingness to accept-study (responders get l-
veto power instead of their monetary endowment, see Footnote 1) limit prices or certainty
equivalents will be substantially higher. We nevertheless expect that a substantial fraction of
responders will bid l-monotonically as observed here.
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You are ahead of two rounds in the experiment. You and some other person whose anonymity will not be
revealed by us can share 3000 HUF in both rounds. Your partners in the two rounds are different persons. First
we explain the rules, according to which the money is shared, then you make decisions. All participants read the
same instructions. After carefully reading these instructions you can privately ask clarifying questions. Please
refrain from any public comments.
Your code number in the experiment:.............................
Save this sheet with your code for sake of identification when you get the money . The money, earned in the
experiment will be paid to you in room 120, right after the experiment.
The meaning of l l
The two participants of the decision situation who can share 3000 HUF are X and Y. (the first character in your
code tells you whether you are an X or Y).
X decides on his offer y to Y with 0 £ y £ 3000, which is what she suggests that Y should get of the total amount
of 3000 HUF. The remainder 3000-y is what X wants to keep.  Then Y decides whether to accept the offer y by
X or not. If she accepts it X and Y get the portions as suggested by X. If Y rejects the offer y, these portions are
modified in a well-defined manner. However, Y has the latter chance (whether to accept or reject) only if she
bought the right of rejecting in advance. If she does not have this right of rejection they share the pie as
suggested by X for sure.
Let us call this rejection right as l!  This parameter l can have three possible values (0, 1/3, 2/3). In the case of
rejection l functions as a factor, X gets an amount of l￿ (3000-y), and Y an amount of l￿y from the pie. As you
can see, by rejection (1-l)￿ 3000 HUF is lost – the smaller the value of l the more money is lost and the more the
amounts suggested by X for Y and for himself change.
How is l l determined?
Whether the rejection right, available for Y, relies on the l-value 0, 1/3 or 2/3 is not known in advance. It is
randomly determined after Y and X  have made their decisions in the experiment. So, Y has to decide for all
three possible l values how much it is worth to her to play the game with rejection right instead of playing it
without this right.
The random price mechanism
Assume that the Y’s decision is about how much it is worth to him to play the game with rejection right l=2/3
instead of not having this right. She can simply make this decision by stating an upper price limit l with 0£l
£1500. For buying the right she gets 1500 HUF from us. The money not spent on this right can be kept by Y.
How much the decisional right actually costs is determined randomly. We randomly choose a value (price=p) in
the range 0< p£1500. If this randomly chosen p is larger than the limit price l, then Y does not buy the rejection
right with l=2/3, i.e. X and Y share the money as X dictates. In case of p£ l, Y has bought this l=2/3-rejection
right, i.e. she can decide whether to accept or reject (multiply both proposed amounts 3000-y and y by l=2/3).
The price p is subtracted from what Y receives in total (the 1500 HUF plus what he gets from the pie).
In the same way Y has to choose a limit  l for l= 0  and l=1/3.
The experiment will proceed as follows (3.a) and (3.b) are simultaneous decisions.
1.Everybody understand the rules reading carefully these instructions.
2.You will have to fill out a simple questionnaire with few control questions regarding the rules.
3.a.) Y chooses her upper price limit for buying rejection right forl=0, 1/3 and 2/3. Y will have to specify the
limit l for all three l-values separately.
3.b) X chooses his offer y to Y for all four possibilities (Y has no rejection right, Y has rejection right with l=0,
1/3 and 2/3). X will have to specify the offer y for all four possibilities.
4. Y decides about her acceptance thresholds separately for all l values( l=0, 1/3 and 2/3).
The acceptance threshold means that Y accepts any offer not smaller than the threshold. Y will have to choose an
acceptance threshold for all three l-values.22
5.Knowing all three limits l for all Y participants we randomly select a price p in the interval 0< p £1500 which
price will be publicly announced. By a random move it will be decided for each pair of X and Y  whether the
value l=0 or  l=1/3 or l= 2/3  can be bought by Y.
6. We compute the earnings of all participants and inform them about what they have earned. After the 1
st round
the experiment is once repeated. In the 2
nd round you meet a new partner, but keep your role (X or Y).
Let us summarize the earnings (p) of X and Y in a round:
If the rejection right is bought by Y:
pX = 3000-yl                , in case of acceptance 
29
pX= (3000-y l ) ￿ l  ,in case of rejection
pY= yl   - p  + 1500                    , in case of acceptance
pY= yl  ￿  l  - p  + 1500       , in case of rejection
If Y does not buy rejection right:
pX = 3000-y
pY= y   + 1500
Control sheet
We give you an easy numerical example for sake of practice. The choices are the same for different l-values just
to make your calculations easier. Of course, in the experiment you can give different values!
Let’s suppose that Y makes the following decisions:
“I am ready to pay at maximum the following amount of money (l) for the different rejection rights (with
different l -values):
(i) l =0         l=550
(ii) l =1/3     l=550
(iii) l =2/3    l=550”
“My acceptance thresholds are as follows:
(i) l=0            I accept all offers with y‡ 1700
(ii) l=1/3        I accept all offers with y‡ 1700
(iii) l=2/3       I accept all offers with y‡ 1700”
X makes the following decisions:
“(i) l =0            y=1650
(ii) l =1/3          y=1650
(iii) l =2/3         y=1650
if Y has no rejection right: y=1650”
the price of rejection right=500
How much X and Y earn if Y can buy rejection right with 0 or 1/3 or 2/3?






















                                                                
29 The unit is HUF (Hungarian Forint), 250 HUF=1$.23
Data sheet
X Y round y(l=0) y(l=1/3) y(l=2/3) y(l=1
)
l(l=0) l(l=1/3) l(l=2/3) d(l=0) d(l=1/3) d(l=2/3) Yexpected
(l=1)
111 111 1 0 0 0 0 0 200 400 1700 1700 1800 1600
112 112 1 1000 500 1000 100 500 700 1000 1499 1700 1900 1500
121 121 1 750 750 750 750 200 350 500 2000 2400 2100 2500
122 122 1 2000 1500 1500 500 1500 500 1000 1500 1500 1500 100
131 131 1 700 1200 1500 400 350 450 550 1000 1500 1500 500
132 132 1 1500 1500 1500 1500 0 0 0 0 0 0
141 141 1 1500 1500 1500 200 300 600 600 1500 1500 1500 1000
142 142 1 1500 500 1000 0 300 300 500 1500 1500 1500 1500
211 211 1 1800 1700 1600 1500 500 500 1000 1800 1800 1800 1500
212 212 1 2000 1800 1200 1000 1000 750 500 1300 1200 1000 700
221 221 1 1800 0 0 0 0 400 500 1300 1400 1500 1350
222 222 1 750 750 750 750 200 400 800 1400 1600 1500 1500
231 231 1 750 750 750 750 500 500 500 1000 1000 1000 1000
232 232 1 1000 1 1 100 200 500 800 1000 1200 1500 1300
241 241 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
242 242 1 1500 0 0 0 0 0 600 0 0 1600 0
311 311 1 2000 1000 100 0 550 650 750 900 1000 1100 2000
312 312 1 1000 950 850 750 200 400 600 1500 1500 1500 1000
321 321 1 500 500 500 0 500 500 500 1500 1500 1500 1500
322 322 1 1500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
331 331 1 400 1000 700 1 0 500 1000 500 500 500 1100
332 332 1 0 0 0 0 500 500 500 750 750 750 11
341 341 1 0 0 0 0 100 250 500 800 900 800 800
342 342 1 1500 750 750 0 0 500 600 1500 1500 1500 2500
411 411 1 750 750 750 750 500 500 500 1500 1500 1000 0
412 412 1 1000 1200 1500 500 1500 1500 1500 1800 1700 1500 1500
421 421 1 1500 1000 1000 0 1250 1350 1000 350 800 1280 800
422 422 1 1200 900 600 300 500 600 600 1600 1800 1500 1900
431 431 1 0 2000 1000 0 200 400 600 500 500 500 1000
432 432 1 1200 1450 1400 1000 250 550 750 1500 1700 1600 1400
441 441 1 1500 1500 1500 1500 200 250 250 1250 1250 1250 1000
442 442 1 500 650 1000 200 300 500 700 1000 1500 1500 1500
511 511 1 1500 750 750 0 10 113 320 1326 1450 1499 1300
512 512 1 1500 750 0 0 0 300 300 0 1500 1500 1400
521 521 1 1500 1500 1500 750 700 600 500 1500 1200 1000 500
522 522 1 300 600 700 750 300 300 300 750 650 500 300
531 531 1 0 0 0 0 500 700 700 1500 1800 1800 0
532 532 1 1400 900 500 500 600 500 400 1700 1600 1500 500
541 541 1 1601 1601 1601 0 250 500 600 2000 1600 1300 1500
542 542 1 1600 1501 1501 0 300 200 100 0 0 0 500
111 112 2 0 0 0 0 500 800 1000 1000 1500 2000 1500
112 111 2 1000 1000 1000 0 0 400 500 1800 1800 1800 0
121 122 2 750 750 750 750 1400 600 800 1400 900 1400 1100
122 121 2 2000 1600 1600 500 250 450 500 2000 2650 2500 2500
131 132 2 500 1500 1700 200 0 0 0 0 0 0
132 131 2 1500 1500 1500 500 350 450 550 1000 1500 1500 500
141 142 2 1500 1200 1000 0 500 500 500 1500 1500 1500 1500
142 141 2 300 550 500 0 300 600 600 1500 1500 1500 1000
211 212 2 1800 1750 1600 1000 800 700 600 1400 1200 1000 800
212 211 2 1500 1000 1000 500 500 600 1000 1000 1800 1800 1500
221 222 2 2000 0 0 0 300 900 750 1400 1000 1500 1100
222 221 2 750 750 750 750 0 400 600 1500 1400 1100 2700
231 232 2 750 750 750 750 200 500 800 500 1000 1500 150024
232 231 2 1 1 1 100 800 800 800 1000 1000 1000 1000
241 242 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 600 0 0 1500 0
242 241 2 1500 1500 1500 0 0 300 500 0 1500 1000 0
311 312 2 2000 1000 100 0 200 600 1000 1500 1500 1500 1000
312 311 2 1500 950 850 750 1000 1500 1500 950 1200 1450 0
321 322 2 500 500 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
322 321 2 1500 0 0 0 800 800 800 2000 2000 2000 1500
331 332 2 1800 970 450 1000 500 500 500 750 750 750 11
332 331 2 0 0 0 0 0 1000 1000 500 500 500 1400
341 342 2 0 0 0 0 0 500 600 1500 1500 1500 0
342 341 2 1500 750 750 0 250 325 499 500 700 800 0
411 412 2 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1700 1800 2000 1800
412 411 2 700 1000 1250 200 500 500 500 1500 1000 500 0
421 422 2 1500 1000 1000 0 0 890 950 500 1000 800 1500
422 421 2 1500 300 300 0 1400 1400 1400 500 800 1000 800
431 432 2 1500 1000 0 0 250 500 750 1500 1700 1600 1400
432 431 2 1100 1000 1000 1200 200 300 400 500 500 500 1000
441 442 2 1500 1500 1500 1500 500 500 500 2000 2000 2000 1000
442 441 2 500 700 800 200 300 300 300 1250 1250 1250 1000
511 512 2 1500 750 750 750 0 300 300 0 1200 1200 1000
512 511 2 1500 750 0 0 1 326 326 1400 1500 1500 0
521 522 2 1500 1500 1500 750 200 300 400 750 700 750 500
522 521 2 750 750 750 750 500 600 700 1500 1300 1500 500
531 531 2 0 0 0 0 600 500 400 1700 1600 1500 800
532 531 2 1200 900 600 0 500 700 700 1000 1800 1800 0
541 542 2 1601 1601 1601 0 350 250 150 0 0 0 200
542 541 2 1200 1401 1501 0 300 601 983 1999 1500 1221 1500